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It has been largely ignored in the commodity stabilization lite-
rature that export quota schemes can cause a co-existence between
a controlled and an uncontrolled market. This article analyzes
the welfare implications of such a scheme on non-participating
importing countries. The determinants of the welfare effects are
elaborated. It is shown that non-participation in the export
quota scheme may increase or decrease the importing countries'
welfare compared to the situation of a liberalized world market.
Magnitude and sign of the welfare impacts are shown to depend
crucially on the rigidity of the quota policy. From the indi-
vidual importing country's point of view, it is derived that
non-participation instead of entering the agreement may raise
national welfare, even if the export quota policy lowers its
welfare level compared to a free trade situation.- 1 -
1. Introduction
There are various world commodity markets on which export
quota schemes are planned or where exports are already restricted
by export quotas (Maizels, 1982; UNCTAD, 1985). However, economic
analysis on commodity price stabilization schemes have mainly
focused on buffer stocks (e.g., Newbery/Stiglitz, 1981). In the
few existing studies on export quotas, their relative efficiency
has been discussed primarily as a device of market stabilization.
Export quotas were compared with export taxes (Ffrench-Davis,
1968) and with buffer stocks (Berlage, 1984; Dick/Gupta/Mayer/
Vincent, 1982). Where price-raising export quota schemes were
analyzed and proposed (Maizels, 1982), their welfare implications
for importing countries have not been elaborated . This seems in-
teresting, however, as recent empirical evidence for the coffee
market has shown that importing countries may gain from a price-
raising export quota scheme by staying outside the agreement
(Herrmann, 1986).
This article analyzes the following questions theoretically:
Which welfare effects occur for importing non-member countries
under an export quota scheme compared to the situation of a uni-
form world market? Which welfare impacts arise for the individual
non-member country compared to a uniform world market and com-
pared to a situation of entering the agreement? Which factors
determine these welfare impacts and how are the impacts depending
on the kind of realized export quota policv?- 2 -
2. Welfare Effects of an Export Quota Scheme on Non-Participat-
ing Importing Countries
Applying welfare analysis to international markets , the
effect of export quota policy on economic welfare of the non-
participating importing countries is
*N ID
W - W* = AW = f a IN IN IN ft', %
W is welfare, q is the quantity imported and p is the price.
The subscript I indicates importing countries, N the non-member
market. * symbolizes the situation without export quota policy
and ~ equilibrium values. (1) shows the difference in welfare
levels of the non-participating importing countries in the situa-
tions with and without export quotas. This difference is mainly
determined by the difference in equilibrium prices on the non-
member market in the situations with and without export quota
policy:
(AW)INI 0, if p* ipN.
Let us assume that an export quota arrangement exists which fixes
the maximum export quantity to be sold on the member market.
There are no direct sanctions toward selling oversupply on the
non-member market. Let us further assume that the hypothetical
situation without export quotas is characterized by a uniform
market price (p* = p* = p*) . Assuming linear functions, the si-
tuations without export quotas (signed by *) and with export
quotas are then represented by the following equations:- 3 -
(2) . qf * = aM + bM p*
ID* ID
(3),(3') qM = CM + dM p*; qM
(4) qf * - aN + bN p*
ID* ID
(5),(5') qN = cN + dN p*; qN
















[10) qN = qN
a, b, c and d are parameters determining the levels and slopes of
the export supply and import demand curves. The signs are:
o
c > 0, c > 0, d < 0, d < 0, a < 0, aM < 0, b > 0, b > 0.
The hypothetical situation without export quotas is given by
the equations (2) to (6). The situation with export quotas is
given by the equations (3
1) , (5
1) , and (7) to (10) . It can be
seen that export quota policy is combined with other equilibrium- 4 -
conditions and will probably lead to different prices and quanti-
ties on both markets compared to the non-quota situation. Equa-
tions (7) and (8) show two policy parameters which are allowed
for in the model:
1. Export quota policy directly fixes q, the maximum quantity
— ~ES* sold on the member market. It is assumed that 0 < q < qM ,
~ID*
2. The commodity control authority may use indirect sanctions
to discriminate the selling of oversupply from the member
market on the non-member market. This will influence the
coefficient r in equation (8). r is a coefficient indicating
the willingness of exporting member countries to transmit
oversupply, due to binding quotas, from the member market to
the non-member market, r is assumed to be an exogenous vari-
able with 0 < r < (aM + bM p* - q)/(aM + bM pM - q) < 1.
Calculating the equilibrium market prices from (2) to (10)













(12) p* = (cM + cN - aM - aN)/(bM + bN -- 5 -
and
=








bN " V '
Equation (11) rewrites equation (1), and equations (12) and (13)
specify the kind of price formation in the situations with and
without export quota policy. Introducing (12) and (13) into (11)
shows how the welfare effect of an export quota policy is af-
fected by parameters and exogenous variables of the market under
consideration.
Equation (1) as well as equation (11) show the general re-
sult that the welfare of non-participating importing countries
may increase or decrease if they stay outside the export quota
arrangement. If the uniform world market price in the hypothe-
tical situation without quotas exceeds the price on the non-
member market in the quota situation (p* > pN) , their welfare
increases compared to the free-market situation. The welfare gain
increases with a rising difference between p* and p . Equation
(11) in combination with (12) and (13) can be used additionally
to show how the welfare effects for non-participating importing
countries depend on the restrictiveness of the export quota poli-
cy on the member market. The change of the welfare effects in
dependency of q and r will be analyzed in the following.- 6 -
3. The Importance of the Degree of Intervention for the Effects
of Quota Policy on the Non-Participating Importing Countries
Equation (11) showed the effect of an export quota policy on
the welfare of non-participating importing countries compared to
a situation of a free market. How does this effect change if the
rigidity of the export quota policy will be altered? This
question can be answered if the equations (12) and (13) are
introduced into (11) and if (11) is differentiated with respect
to the policy parameters q and r. A change in the rigidity of the
direct export quota policy finds expression in a change of q and
this alters the welfare effects as follows:


















(AW_..)- indicates the first partial derivative and (AWTvr)— the IN q IN qq
second partial derivative of (AWTN) with respect to q.
The equations (14) and (15) have interesting economic impli-
cations. The welfare effects on non-participating importing coun-
tries, caused by quota policy on the member market, decrease with
an increase in q and are a strictly convex function of q. The
first derivative shows that a marginal reduction of the export
quota fixed on the member market will accelerate a welfare-in-— 7 —
creasing effect for the non-participating importing countries or
will dampen a welfare-decreasing effect for these countries. The
second derivative shows that a welfare-increasing effect for the
non-participating importing countries will be accelerated the
more, the lower q and the more restrictive the export quota poli-
cy on the member market. Analogously, a welfare-decreasing effect
for these countries will be dampened the more, the lower q.
From the signs of (11) and (14) it follows that the export quota
policy on the member market will rather increase welfare of non-
participating importing countries the lower the fixed export
quota. The signs of the equations (11), (14) and (15) can be used
to derive possible policy-effects functions depending on q. These
functions are shown in Figure 1.





At CLjayf a market separation occurs between the member and
the non-member market. Quotas lower than q are binding on the
importers' and on the exporters' side of the member market. Fi-
gure 1 illustrates that a welfare-increasing effect on non-
participating importing countries can be expected the more, the
lower the fixed export quota on the member market. In case 1,
welfare would increase over the whole range of binding export
quotas with a decreasing q. In case 2, it would increase for the
lower values of q. The welfare-increasing case 1 would arise if
the autarky price on the non-member market exceeded that on the
member market.
Indirectly, the commodity control authority may influence r.
A change in r can be realized by introducing more or less re-
strictive sanctions towards exporting member countries that sell
quota-induced surpluses on the non-member market. A change in r
can also be realized by changing the intensity of control meas-
ures towards these sales to the non-member market. A change in
these policy measures that indirectly affects r will alter the











(AWIN) symbolizes the first partial derivative and (AW ) the
second partial derivative of (AW ) with respect to r.
The equations (16) and (17) show that the welfare effects on
non-participating importing countries, caused by quota policy on
the member market, increase with a rising r and are a strictly
convex function of r. The first derivative shows that a marginal
increase in the transmission coefficient r will accelerate a wel-
fare-increasing effect for the non-participating importing coun-
tries or will dampen a welfare-decreasing effect for these coun-
tries. The second derivative shows that a welfare-increasing
effect for the non-participating importing countries will be
accelerated the more, the higher r and the more liberalized the
sanctions towards the sale of quota-induced surpluses on the
non-member market. Analogously, a welfare-decreasing effect for
these countries will be dampened the more, the higher r.
From the signs of (11) and (16) it can be concluded that the
export quota policy will rather increase welfare of non-partici-
pating importing countries, the weaker the sanctions towards the
sale of quota-induced surpluses to the non-member market.
The signs of the equations (11) , (16) and (17) can be used
to derive possible policy-effects functions depending on r. These
functions are shown in Figure 2.- 10 -
Figure 2: Possible Policy-Effects Functions AWTN = f(r)
With r = 1, the whole oversupply from the member market is
transmitted to the non-member market. For r < 1, only a parti-
cular share is transmitted. Figure 2 illustrates that a welfare-
increasing effect on non-participating importing countries can
rather be expected, the lower the restrictions on the shifting of
quantity surpluses to the non-member market. In case 1, welfare
would increase for the whole range of possible transmission co-
efficients r. In case 2, it would increase for the highest values
of r. The welfare-increasing case 1 would arise if the autarky
price on the non-member market exceeded that on the member mar-
ket.- 11 -
4. Welfare Effects on Non-participating Importing Countries
under Modified Assumptions
a) r = 0
The welfare impacts of an export scheme on non-participating
importing countries, as analyzed up to now, are based on the as-
sumption 0 < r <^ 1. This implies that the export supply curve on
the non-member market shifts to the right in the quota situation
since quota-induced overages are transmitted to the non-member
market. How does this assumption influence the results? Assume
that the commodity control authority succeeds in a total market
separation so that quota-induced trade between member and non-
member countries does not take place. The reason might be high
penalties and strict controls of the trade with non-member coun-
tries. In this case, r is equal to zero and market price forma-
tion on the non-member market coincides with a situation of
autarky on this market. The general welfare impacts shown in
formulae (1) and (11) are still valid. Moreover, the hypothetical
uniform world market price shown in (12) holds further. The equi-
librium price on the non-member market under the quota system
changes, however, to
- aN)/(bN - dN).
This is equal to the autarky price on the non-member market.
Introducing (12) and (13') into (11) and differentiating with
respect to q yields the following results:- 12 -
(14t
)




1. If r = 0, export quota policy on the member market induces a
welfare impact on non-participating importing countries. It can
be positive, negative, or arbitrarily zero. The effect is again
positive if the price on the non-member market is lower in the
quota situation than the uniform world market price in the situa-
tion without quotas.
2. If r = 0, the welfare impact on non-participating importing
countries is only a consequence of market separation between the
member and the non-member market. It is totally independent of q
and, therefore, of the restrictiveness of the export quota policy
on the member market.
Additionally, the comparison of (11) to (13) with (11), (12) and
(13') shows that the price in the situation with export quota
policy is higher with r = 0 than with 0 < r _<_ 1. Therefore, the
welfare gains from quota policy are lower or the welfare losses
are higher with r = 0 than with 0 < r < 1.G<8S
fiir Wdtwirtecheft Ki@l
- 13 -
b) The individual non-participating importing country's point
of view
The following questions are answered in the sections 2 and 3:
Which welfare effects occur as a consequence of an export quota
scheme for all non-participating importing countries compared to
the situation of a liberalized world market? How do these effects
depend on the kind of quota policy? From the national point of
view of a single non-participating importing country, more rele-
vant questions are: Which welfare effects occur for the own coun-
try as a consequence of an export quota scheme compared to the
situation of a liberalized world market? How do these national
effects depend on the kind of quota policy? To answer these
questions for an individual country i, the import demand quantity
of all non-participating importing countries has to be divided
into that of country i (qM.) and that of all others (q.T ) . It
J Nl ^No
follows that
TID* _ ^ID* + ^ID* . ID = ID + ID
' N Ni No
with
(19), (19-) q*f = CN. + d^ P* ,
and
(19"), (19-")- 14 -
Export quota policy on the member market will lead to the follow-










1 0, if p* i pN .
Solving the definite integral in equation (20) and introducing
(19) and (19') into (20) yields:
(20') AWT.t. = cM. p* + 0.5 dXT. p* - c.T. p\7 - 0.5 d. T. p.. INi Ni ^ Ni * Ni *N NI ^N
The equilibrium market prices to be used in (20") follow from the
equation system (2) to (10), where (5) and (5
1) are substituted
by (18) to (20') :
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The combination of (20
1), (21), and (22) shows which welfare
effect results from an export quota scheme for a non-participat-
ing importing country i and how the effect depends on the para-
meters and exogenous variables under consideration. Introducing
(21) and (22) into (20') and differentiating (20') partially with
respect to the policy parameters q and r shows how the national- 15 -
welfare effects for a non-participating importing country i
change if the quota policy changes. The following results occur:
C.,.+CL, -a -r(au+(bu q -b.. cM) /d,. - q) Nl No N M M
 M M M' M
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(AWTM.)- and (AW_...)— symbolize the first and second derivatives INl q INl qq
of (AW_ . ) with respect to q. (AWTN • ) and (AW . ) are the
first and second derivatives with respect to r. The equation?
(20) to (26) indicate that an export quota scheme on a market of
participating countries creates welfare effects for a non-parti-
cipating importing country that are similar to those for all non-
participating importing countries. The main results from (20) to
(26) are:- 16 -
1. An individual non-participating importing country may gain
or lose from an export quota scheme carried out on the mem-
ber market. It gains from the export quota scheme if its
national import price in the quota situation is lower than
in the hypothetical non-quota situation.
2. As long as the participating exporting countries will trans-
mit a part of the quota-induced oversupply from the member
to the non-member market (0 < r _<_ 1) , the magnitude of the
welfare effect for a non-participating importing country is
a function of the policy parameters. (AWTN>) is a decreasing
and strictly convex function of q. Moreover, (AWT .) is an
increasing and strictly convex function of r. Therefore,
export quota policy on the member market will rather in-
crease welfare of the non-participating importing country,
- the more restrictive the quota policy on the member mar-
ket, and
- the lower the penalties for participating exporting coun-
tries selling quota-induced oversupply to non-participat-
ing importing countries.
The policy effects functions which were shown in Figure 1
and 2 for all non-participating importing countries, are also
valid for the individual non-participating importing countrv.
The national point of view can be further elaborated if we
make the small-country assumption. This assumption implies












 qNi- 17 -
Again, (20') show the export quota policy's welfare effect for
the non-participating importing country. However, prices entering
into (20') are now independent of the coefficients of the indi-
vidual country's import demand function . It follows that
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From (20') to (22'), it can be immediately shown how the national




 (AWINi>cN. = ?* ~ ^ 1°
(28
)
(29), (29>) (AW ) = (AW ) = 0
INI cc ±NI cta
This implies: If the welfare of the non-participating importing
country increases due to export quota policy (p* > p ) , this
welfare gain will be the larger,
the higher cN>, i.e. the higher the import demand level of
country i for the product under quotas;- 18 -
the higher dN-, i.e. the more price-inelastic the import
demand function of country i for the product under quotas.
On the other hand, a given welfare decrease of the non-partici-
pating importing country due to export quota policy {p* < p )
will also be the larger the higher cN> and the higher d . . Ob-
viously, high national import demand levels and absolutely low
national price elasticities of import demand cause strong quota-
induced welfare effects in either direction.
Up to now, it was analyzed which effects occur from the
non-participating importing country's view compared to the non-
quota situation. This is an important question of positive eco-
nomics. Once an quota system is implemented, however, this is not
the relevant question for the decision calculus of the non-parti-
cipating importing country. The country can decide to stay out-
side the agreement or to enter the agreement as a member country.
It cannot decide by itself to restore a non-quota situation. From
the decision-oriented point of view, the relevant import price
for this country is again p\., if it stays outside the agreement,
but pM instead of p* if it enters the agreement. The welfare
effect for the non-participating importing country from, deciding
not to participate in the quota arrangement is then
(30) AWXM. =
 ; qM. (p) dp < 0, if p\. < p.. .
INl pM Nl — M — N
The hypothetical situation when country i entered the agreement
would be represented by the following import demand relation-
ships:- 19 -







ID* = c + d D*
ID* qM is the import demand quantity of all member countries in the
ID* hypothetical situation, qM is that of the current group of
ID* member countries and qM- is the additional quantity of country
i. In comparison with equation (19), it holds that c . = cM., dN.
= dM.. In comparison with equation (3), it holds that: cM = cM;
d = dM. Solving the definite integral in (30) and introducing
(19) and (32) into (30), it follows:
(30') AWT... = cM. p* + 0.5 dM. p* - c.T. p., - 0.5 d.T. pZ. . INl Ml ^M Ml ^M Ni ^N Ni ^N
The equilibrium market price in the hypothetical situation with
country i as a member country can be derived from the equation




 CMi - W
/(dMi
The equilibrium market price on the non-member market in the
existing situation is again represented by equation (22).
The combination of (30') , (34) and (22) shows which welfare
effect results for a non-participating importing country from
staying outside instead of entering the export quota agreement.
Introducing (34) and (22) in (30') and differentiating (30')- 20 -
partially with respect to the policy parameters q and r shows how
this national welfare effect changes if the quota policy changes.
The following results can be derived:
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(38)-(26) (AWIN.)rr - (-15 " _ M _M )2 . ( N Nl No- 21 -
The following results can be derived from equations (30
1),
(34) , (24) and (35) to (38) :
1. The decision of a non-participating importing country to
stay outside of an export quota agreement may be correct or
wrong from purely economic reasons. The decision causes a
welfare gain, as far as the country's national import price
is lower if it stays outside than if it enters the agree-
ment.
2. If 0 < r _<_ 1, the magnitude of the welfare effect for a
non-participating importing country is a function of the
policy parameters. (AWTN.) is a decreasing function of q
that may be either convex or concave. Moreover, (AWTN.) is
an increasing and strictly convex function of r. Therefore,
the decision of the importing country to stay outside in-
stead of entering the agreement is rather correct,
- the more restrictive the quota policy on the member mar-
ket, and
- the lower the penalties for participating exporting coun-
tries who sell quota-induced oversupply to non-participat-
ing importing countries.
How did the results change due to a change in the reference
system? Does it matter whether the welfare effects for the non-
participating importing country are measured in a decision-
oriented perspective or by the comparison with and without poli-
cy? Comparing equations (30') and (34) to (38) with (20) to (26)
yields the following results:- 22 -
1. Generally, the welfare gains are higher or the welfare los-
ses are smaller if the alternative staying outside or enter-
ing the agreement is considered. The reason is that a bind-
ing export quota policy raises the hypothetical import price
on the member market beyond the level of the non-quota situ-
ation. Hence, it becomes more favorable to stay outside the
quota agreement due to the change of the reference system.
2. The comparison of (35) and (23) shows that (AW .) increases
at a higher rate with a marginal decrease in q if the alter-
native staying outside or entering the agreement is con-
sidered. However, (AWTN•) must no longer be a strictly con-
vex function of q under this reference system.
3. The national policy-effects function (AW .) = f(r) remains
unaffected by the change in the reference system.
From these comparisons, an important conclusion follows. A
non-participating importing country may be made worse off by
introducing export quotas on an otherwise liberalized market.
However, it is possible that the country realizes a welfare gain
in this situation by staying outside instead of entering the
agreement.
c) Cost of participation in the agreement
Up until now, it has been assumed that participation in the
agreement would be costless. However, financial contributions to
the commodity control authority will be necessary if the country- 23 -
enters the agreement. Let C.(> 0) be the financial cost of par-
ticipating in the agreement. Due to rising decision-making cost
with lowering q, it can be assumed that (C.)- < 0. The signs of
(C.^)-- , (Ci)r , and (Ci) are ambiguous. The decision to stay
outside or to enter the agreement will be affected as follows.
Instead of (30) and (30
1), the welfare implication of non-parti-










(39') AWT.T. = cM. p* + 0.5 dM. p* - c... p.. - 0.5 d_T. pM - C. INl Ml *M Ml *M Nl *N Nl ^N l
Introducing (34) and (22) into (39') and differentiating (39')
partially with respect to q and r yields:
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The following results can be derived, if the equations (39) to
(43) are compared with the preceding results:
1. If the financial costs of participation in the agreement are
taken into account, the decision to stay outside the export
quota agreement becomes even more favorable. The non-parti-
cipating importing countries may realize welfare gains from
this decision even if the import price is lower if it enters
the agreement than if it stays outside.
2. Including costs of participation, a reduction of export
quotas on the member market becomes more favorable for the
non-participating importing countries than without consider-
ing these costs.- 25 -
3. The policy-effects function AWT_,. = f(r) may be increasing,
decreasing, or constant and may be either convex or concave
if C. is additionally considered. The shape of the cost
function in dependency of r is crucial for the result.
5. Summary and Conclusions
In the preceding analysis, impacts of an export quota agreement
on the welfare of non-participating importing countries were in-
vestigated theoretically. It was assumed that quotas are fixed
for exports to importing member countries, whereas exports to the
non-member countries are not controlled. The main results are:
1. Individual non-participating importing countries as well as
the whole group of these countries may gain or lose from
such an export quota agreement compared to the non-quota
situation. They will gain if their import price in the quota
situation is lower than in the non-quota situation. This is
more likely to occur, the lower the export quota on the
member market and the higher the willingness of exporting
member countries to shift surpluses from the member to the
non-member market.
2. If the small-country assumption is valid, an existing wel-
fare gain for the non-participating importing countries will
be larger the larger its import demand level and the more
price-inelastic its import demand function for the product
under quotas.- 26 -
3. If the alternative of entering the agreement or staying
outside the agreement is taken into account, the outsider
position becomes more favorable than if it is compared to
the non-quota situation. This holds even more if the finan-
cial costs of participating in the agreement are considered.
Generally, the analysis shows that strong economic incentives can
exist for importing countries to stay outside an export quota ar-
rangement.
In future research, the analysis could be extended in sev-
eral directions. Theoretically, it could be investigated how the
results change if the model's assumptions are changed. Non-linear
functions, dynamic relationships, a non-competitive market, a
multi-dimensional objective function, or uncertainty could be
introduced into the model. The analysis could also be carried out
for exporting countries. Empirically, this or an extended model
could be applied to various regulated markets like oil, rubber,
or tin.
Notes
1) A purely price-stabilizing system of flexible export quotas
has been recommended by Kaldor (1964) , pp. 112 et seq.
2) See Just/Hueth/Schmitz (1982), Section 4, 5, 6, and 8.6.
3) In a strong sense, the following equations in this section
should be interpreted as approximations although the equali-
ty sign is used.- 27 -
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